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PREFACE
IIASA's Energy Systems Program has performed an extensive
analysis of the long-range global energy problem. In 1981 Energy
in a Finite World (IIASA's Energy Systems Program 1981) was pub-
lished--a report summarizing the major findings of an international
team of experts working since 1972 under the leadership of Wolf
Hafele. In the format of two scenarios--a High and a Low scenario--
the factual basis for balancing demand and supply in a cooperative
world was laid down.
How to use this body of knowledge and information in the real
world context--competitive, full of conflicts, and highly dis-
counting both in time and space--was a spontaneous question that
came up in the intense dialogue between the Energy Systems Program
and many audiences in science, industry and policy making.
This paper tries to capture and order some of the suggestions
put forward in this dialogue, in order to apply a long-range and
global perspective to short-term national decision making.
The paper was prepared in January 1981. The conclusions
then put forward seem to be supported by the political events
that have occurred since, both by those in Egypt and more generally
and recently in the Middle East. Default of updating of this
ｾ ｡ ｰ ･ ｲ to actual publication is therefore intended.
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THE CHANGED INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SUPPLY SITUATION
The events of 1973 have prompted a drastic change in the
world's oil markets--and more than that: it appears that the
process that is called general economic and industrial develop-
ment has in some fundamental respects entered a critical stage.
This was not obvious during the five years between 1973 and
1978, when what was going on was understood as being a disturbance
in a major, though clearly separableJ sector of the overall economy.
The explication seemed appropriate, for oil was not scarce; there
was a problem of oil price, but contrary to expectations the re-
cycling of petrodollars worked out satisfactorily.
Since then there have been increasing signs for an impending
break to arise in the practice of international division of labor
and consequently in free trade and exchange. Generalizing from
such signs, which are clear now in the international energy field,
is not out of place: energy is a basic production factor and both
directly and indirectly ｡ ｦ ｦ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｳ all human material dealings and
therefore also general international trade.
The events that followed after 1978 were clearly different
from the initial development after 1973. Those listed below
are closely related to the international energy problem .
• In 1978, i.e., four years after the first oil crisis,
Western industrialized countries for the first time
clearly adjusted downward their estimates of medium- and
long-term economic growth.
• During 1978 the imminent downfall of the government of
the Shah of Iran became obvious, starting off severe
political instability in the region of the Persian Gulf.
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• As a consequence of the Iranian revolution, spot market
oil prices doubled and the official OPEC price listing
was raised to $30 per barrel of oil.
• The volume of Iranian oil exports predominantly going to
Western countries was greatly reduced. But even the
Eastern countries appeared to be directly affected by the
export policy of the Gulf region, due to the indefinite
postponement of the three-partite natural gas trade be-
tween Iran, the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe.
• Following the taking of hostages in the U.S. embassy in
Teheran and the invasion in Afghanistan, governments
ordered trade embargoes.
• Oil transport and delivery from production facilities in
the area of Shat-el-Arab was crippled by the outbreak of
war between Iraq and Iran.
• With the strain on Soviet potential for delivering oil
to other CMEA members, supply deficiencies in the Eastern
countries became apparent. For meeting their future oil
deficits, the allies were referred to the world oil markets
by the U.S.S.R. in the later half of 1980.
• At the time Saudi Arabia decided to make up for the gap in
overall OPEC oil exports resulting from the Iran-Iraq war
by stepping up its short-term oil production.
• The nuclear energy debate in Western industrialized coun-
tries gradually calmed down in the course of 1980; this
was due to a marked slowdown in economic growth and a
correspondingly lower demand for rapidly extending national
electricity supply systems.
• In spite of the accident in the U.S. nuclear power plant
Three Mile Island, Sweden, Switzerland, and the F.R.G.
worked out political compromises permitting a limited
buildup of nuclear supply capacities.
THE LONG-TERM GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVE
There is one aspect in particular in which scientific anal-
ysis may contribute to an assessment of the international energy
supply situation, that is, by making transparent the technical
opportunities of and the constraints for a solution to the global
energy problem.
A comprehensive study attempting to approach the energy
problem in this way has been undertaken and recently completed
by the Energy Systems Program of the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) at Laxenburg, Austria (1981).
The study looks into what options basically exist for balancing
energy supply and demand in major world regions over the period
from 1980 to 2030. In doing so it accounts for different Eastern
and Western viewpoints and attempts an adequate representation
of the requirements peculiar to the developing countries.
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Interpretation of the study results is crucially dependent
on the assumption that efficient use is being made of energy in
a mostly cooperative world. The assumption translates into a
cost-dependent, but unrestricted, access to all of the globe's
energy resources. The only important exception to this rule is
Mid-East and North African oil resources (located in one scenario
region); on account of the situation in this area before 1978,
availability of these resources was considered to be limited.
By invoking basic assumptions of this kind it was possible to
quantify the further development of the energy system with re-
spect to the minimum technical and economic requirements and in
accordance with a further development of the world's economy.
These assumptions do not permit one to predict the development
that is most probable to occur, however (Figure 1).
A main result of the study is the insight that fossil energy
sources must and will continue to dominate the energy supply of
the next 50 years. Other fossil energies that will be used in-
creasingly, complementing the conventional reserves of oil and
gas, are coal and less easily accessible and "dirtier" hydro-
carbons as well as oil shales; tar sands; natural gas from deep-
gas formations; and oil from polar and deep off-shore deposits.
Before the year 2000 it will already be necessary to make this
transition to fossil resources which can only at very high cost
be exploited, transported, and processed to synthetic fuels.
Because of the concentration of deposits of coal and unconven-
tional oil and gas resources, this development is expected to
influence considerably the environment, the labor situation,
and the economic sectors concerned (Figure 2).
Meeting the demand for liquid hydrocarbons turns out to be
a particularly pressing issue. Although the study assumes size-
able energy conservation measures in general and more rigid limi-
tations on the use of liquid fuels in transportation and for
chemical feedstocks, it nevertheless spells the need for building
up a synfuel industry on a global scale during the next twenty
years (Figure 3).
A similarly radical challenge is the assumed development of
renewable energy sources, that is, of hydropower, biomass, and
localized sources, such as solar energy for hot water and low
temperature uses. However, in terms of the overall global energy
balance the potential contributions from these sources are rather
limited.
The last observation also applies to nuclear energy. In
absolute numbers, nuclear energy provides an increasingly large
amount. But its application is expected to be restricted to
electricity supply, which in turn meets only 20% of the overall
final energy demand. By using nuclear energy for electricity
purposes, sufficient quantities of coal become available world-
wide that could be used for the necessary buildup of a synfuel
industry. Yet, in spite of this limited use of nuclear energy,
it still appears necessary to introduce nuclear breeder reactors
around the year 2000. This is due to the earth's constrained
resources of natural uranium; the energy yield that can be ob-
tained from them by employing present-day light water reactors
only compares to the energy content of classical oil resources.
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IlfII Region III
II§] Region IV
·:r:CI:. Region VI I I It
iii Region VI
EJZ] Region VII
(NA) North America
(SU/EE) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(WE/JANZ) Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
S. Africa, and Israel
(LA) Latin America
(Af/SEA) Africa (except Northern Africa and S. Africa),
South and Southeast Asia
(ME/NAt) Middle East and Northern Africa
(C/CPA) China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies
FIGURE 1. The Seven World Regions in IIASA's Energy Study (1981).
For estimation of the long-term developnent of energy demand and
supply, the globe's more than 160 countries were grouped into world
regions, their allocation depending on levels of economic develop-
ment and fossil resource base. The study assumes free access to
all energy resources (except for oil and gas resources in the Middle
East and Northern Africa) .
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FIGURE 2. Primary Energy Shares in a Future Global Energy Balance
(I IASA 19 81) .
Within a wide range of increasing per capita world energy demand,
of only 25% up to almost twice the value, there are only minor
shifts in the primary supply picture. The extended use of con-
ventional energy sources in some regions, however, accelerates
the need for change to more costly and controversial energy sources
in other regions. The transition towards a world's energy supply
that is based on nuclear and direct solar energy can be initiated
but not completed in this 50 year period.
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FIGURE 3. Global Oil Supply Excluding Centrally Planned Econo-
mies, IIASA High Scenario (IIASA 1981).
Although the use of liquid hydrocarbons is increasingly limited
to feedstocks and transportation, the two IIASA scenarios (cf.
Figure 4) require enormous exploitation efforts for unconventional
oil. For comparison, the new oil fields assumed to be available
in 1990 would have to provide the same amounts as are now being
exported from Region VI. Ten years later, oil from tar sands
and shales would have to increase at the same rate, and shortly
after 2000 coal would have to be liquified at a world scale in
order to meet the demand for liquid hydrocarbons. These considera-
tions presuppose continuity of exports from the Mid-Eastern and
Northern African oil countries.
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In trying to understand the future of the world's energy
system it does not help to take one's cue from what shares the
various primary energies are capable or expected to contribute.
Rather, the imbalance in the prospective development comes out
tlearly if one weighs the stupendous amount of investments that
would be required for the provision of any type of energy and its
economically efficient use against the modest improvement in
material welfare that could be achieved in this way. It appears
that both IIASA reference scenarios, fixing rates of economic
growth in accordance with possible energy supply options, clearly
undercut current aspirations. While the economic growth in the
industrialized countries is assumed to continually recede at
annual growth rates of one percent or less than one, the per
capita income in the developing countries turns out to remain
at generally the same distance from that in the developed
nations (Figure 4).
THE CASE OF THE RESOURCE-POOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Besides exploring the overall global energy problem, IIASA's
investigations also shed light on the critical conditions of
energy supply in Western European countries and in Japan which,
for purposes of the study were considered one region. These
OECD countries (excluding the U.S.A. and Canada) were found to
be crucially dependent on energy imports still until the year
2030.
Stabilizing this region's oil imports at present levels does
appear possible, but the price eventually to be paid for follow-
ing the higher economic growth path (and not the lower reference
scenario) is big imports of coal and natural gas. Given the
global resource situation, these imports--in whatever technical
form, as feedstocks or synthetic fuels--will have to come from
North America or Siberia. (Note that Australian and South African
energy resources are accounted for as domestic regional resources.)
In either reference case, this ｧ ｾ ｯ ｵ ｰ of OECD countries will be
the only world region to compete with the group of resource-
deficient developing countries for oil that is produced in the
Middle East and in North Africa. According to the study, North
America may in contrast become independent of Mid-East oil by
2000, owing to its large domestic fossil resource base. Other
regions that may maintain their resource independence are the
Eastern countries as well as China (Figure 5).
A separate and very detailed study has been undertaken by
IIASA in cooperation with the Commission of the European Communi-
ties (1980), with the goal of looking into the medium- and long-
term energy prospects of the EC countries. Here the unfavorable
condition of the region comes out even more clearly. In order not
to exceed an import ceiling of about 50% of the primary energy
needs the EC will have to provide for reduced economic growth,
very big energy conservation efforts, and the development of all
domestic energy sources including nuclear energy, as well as the
implementation of new conversion technologies for energy, trans-
port, and utilization. Altogether five scenarios were elaborated
to check out the interplay of different technological, economic,
and consumption-oriented factors.
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Historical
Growth Rate Projected Growth Rate of Per
of Per GDP Per Capita GDP (%/yr)
Capita GDP Capita High Scenario Low Scenario
(\/yr) (dollars) 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000-
Region 1950-1975 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.9 7,046 2.9 1.8 1.7 0.7
II (SU/EE) 6.7 2,562 3.6 3.2 3.1 1.9
III (WE/JANZ) 4.0 4,259 3.0 1.8 1.7 0.9
rv (LA) 2.9 1,066 3.0 2.4 1.6 1.9
V (Af/SEA) 2.5 239 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.4
VI (ME/NAf) 5.7 1,429 3.8 2.8 2.4 1.2
VII (C/CPA) 5.1 352 2.8 2.4 1.6 1.4
NOTE: All growth rates are average annual growth rates (rounded) over the
time period shown; actual projections have decreasing growth rates.
FIGURE 4. Growth of Per Capita GDP in the World Regions (IIASA
1981) •
Optimism or pessimism characterizing the growth rate projections
in the two IIASA scenarios can be assessed by comparing them to
historical growth rates. The IIASA Low scenario, for example,
does not anticipate a radical improvement in material welfare for
the world's poor living in Regions V and VII by 2030; their share
in the global population is expected to rise from 57% to 65%.
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FIGURE 5. Energy Imports of western Europe and Japan (IIASA 1981).
In spite of enhanced energy saving and oil substitution, Region III
remains dependent on the Mid-East during the next 50 years in
IIASA's Low scenario. In the High scenario, the oil imports are
cut down after 2000 at the cost of an ever greater dependence on
coal, coal-derived products, and natural gas. In order for enough
oil to be available to Region III, U.S. oil imports are assumed to
go down to zero by the year 2000 and centrally planned economies
to be able to produce sufficient oil of their own.
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As a result, the scenarios reveal how tightly and directly
linked general economic growth, nuclear power buildup, and pos-
sible reductions in oil imports are for the EC region in the short
and medium term. Only around and after the year 2000 will the
EC energy system be flexible enough to loosen the ties of this
direct interchange with the help of the alternative energy measures
considered. One may suspect that a similarly detailed analysis of
the energy situation in Japan would show that the problem of the
latter is analoguous (Figures 6 and 7).
LIMITS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE
IIASA's energy study attempts to show what appears feasible
under technical, environmental, and economic boundary conditions.
The energy strategy quantifications--indicating the scope of
using the various energy technologies as well as the levels of
energy production and exchange--provide a yardstick against which
one may gauge and compore developments in various parts of the
world and their interactions. The initial assumption of the
world's demand for energy being met under conditions of ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｲ ｾ
able international cooperation is the basis for this comparison.
Assuming a certain measure of political rivalry, economic compe-
tition, and social friction to continue to persist in real-world
affairs, this premise implies that the IIASA scenarios are the
utmost of what can be considered politically feasible.
Given a definition of the upper boundary of the development
conceived, it is possible to identify modifications thereof that
cannot be downright excluded but generally suggest an aggreva-
tion of the energy problem in parts of the global system.
For one thing, the actual development since 1975, the base
year for the study calculations, does not match the assumption
of a free, production cost-dependent access to the world's energy
reserves. Countries other than the OPEC group have come to limit
their oil and gas productions in view of national long-term needs.
Norway and Mexico are examples. For another thing, it is a mat-
ter of doubt whether known fossil resources such as Canadian tar
sands or U.S. oil shales for example are in fact ｾ ｯ ｩ ｮ ｧ to be ex-
ploited effectively or whether and at what scale nuclear energy
is going to be used, given the public's perception and the exist-
ing factual knowledge of the ecological and social impacts of these
options. Still another discrepancy between the scenario and real-
world situations is the fact that almost all primary energy pro-
ducers have followed adjusting their commodity prices upward just
as OPEC did after 1973.
Thus oil still functions as the reference energy source in
energy supply. Needless to say, it is very hard upon nations
to try to accommodate under such circumstances the effects such
oil price increases have on their foreign trade balance, by
shifting imports to other fossil energy forms such as gas or
coal; this dilemma by definition does not arise in the IIASA
scenarios (Figure 8).
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1980).
Five Long-Term Energy Scenarios for the EC (Commission
Five scenarios were developed to describe possible combinations
of desirable economic growth, technical energy conservation, and
supply options. As a result, nuclear energy and oil appear to be
the supply options most strongly affected by economic growth and
technological progress.
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FIGURE 7. Comparison of the Role of Nuclear Energy and Crude Oil
in the Five EC Scenarios (Commission 1980).
In the short and medium term, the EC scenarios indicate the tight
coupling between oil dependence and nuclear programs. Only after
almost 20 years can other energy sources, and in the first place
coal, help decouple the triad of economic growth, oil, and nuclear
energy. It is highly unlikely that the projected nuclear capaci-
ties will materialize in the 1980s and 1990s. The actual economic
development since 1975, the calculation base year, leads one to
conclude that the inherent economic potential may not be used fully
either.
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FIGURE 8. Development of Energy Prices for Industrial Large
Consumers in the F.R.G. (Doblin 1981)
A long-term comparison of energy prices to be paid by the consumer
shows that prices of oil and oil products have a reference function.
In the F.R.G. as well as in other European countries and in the
U.S.A., the prices of potential oil substitutes, apart from some
exceptions, have closely followed the price trend set by OPEC
countries.
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A fundamental uncertainty about energy futures of Western
Europe and Japan is due to substantial differences in the energy
setting of those countries as compared to North America, Eastern
countries, and the Middle East. Relative small fluctuations in
the balancing of energy supply and demand in North America and
the Eastern countries are bound to generate improportionately
greater demands for OPEC oil. This follows from the distribution
of energy consumption among the various regions buying energy on
the international market. The resource-poor industrialized coun-
tries are extremely sensitive to such fluctuations since they
would be forced to make up for their oil supply deficiencies by
importing more of other fossil resources such as coal, unconven-
tional hydrocarbons, and natural gas from North America and the
Eastern countries. As regards any further reductions in the
availability of oil from the Persian Gulf region, Western Europe
and Japan would be just as susceptible to them.
This predicament essentially suggests that Western Europe
and Japan should undertake to reinforce development of their own
energy sources, complementing supplies by energy imports that in
a case of classical resource scarcity are not automatically in
overwhelming demand by the other industrialized regions. Here
uranium and low-quality coals come to one's mind; but using them
would presuppose independent technological programs that to some
extent differ from the R&D programs for resource exploitation
in the U.S.A. and Canada, and the Eastern countries.
This logic implies a duplication of efforts in international
energy technology development that has purposely been excluded
from the IIASA scenarios. While this diversification could in
principle alleviate the supply risks for Europe and Japan, it
would in the final analysis affect the global system in a similar
way as if individual nations were trying to save their resources
for the generations to come.
Realization of the strategies quantified in the IIASA sce-
narios postulates immense efforts and investments worldwide.
It is not possible to state at this point to what extent this
will encourage national or local efforts to search for solutions
to the energy problem. If the actual trend were similar
to what present circumstances seem to suggest, the problems that
countries with a limited classical resource base will encounter
would be even more severe than the prospective regional capital
requirements quantified in the IIASA scenarios for the purpose
of orientation. This reasoning applies directly to the countries
of Western Europe and Japan. Practically the only resort left to
them would be to accelerate the implementation of energy strategies
mentioned in the previous section, which is to exploit and utilize
all energy supply alternatives such as nuclear energy, unconventional
fossil fuels, and renewables, and introduce much ｴ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｾ ･ ｲ energy
conservation measures. There seems to be no room for them to
choose from holding back on one or the other measure.
Besides, the economic difficulties arising from the energy
problem may tend to set back efforts at speeding up the imple-
mentation of such programs. Chances are tough, for the costs
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that arise would have to be borne at a time when the countries'
balance of payments is charged with rocketing import bills and
their stand against international competition is weakened by
higher factor costs.
CONCLUSIONS
It is not possible to predict what new events will add to
that list of political events summed up in the first section; and
as a consequence one cannot assess the feedbacks they would have
on the international energy supply system. Whatever they are go-
ing to be like, the national energy programs that are being initi-
ated and implemented in the various countries will have to prepare
for such feedbacks effectively. Inadequate preparations for the
future--bona fide designed to buffer impacts of adverse political
events on the international energy situation--might trigger such
events or even their roots.
Factually speaking, national energy programs in their
entirety seem to constitute a more reliable indicator of how the
international energy situation will develop in the decades ahead
than a crystal ball that should serve to predict how the list of
political events that have accompanied "the energy problem" will
be extended. But no attempt has yet been made to put together
and look into the actual adjustments of the national energy programs
to the development since 1973 in such a truly comprehensive fashion.
Such a survey is missing. Even if it existed it should and could
only be interpreted within a long-range and global perspective.
This is the real development problem coming up for developed and
developing, resource-rich and resource-poor nations alike.
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